The Limits of Coercion: Legal and Strategic Constraints in Israel’s Policy Toward Iran

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor in Iranian Studies at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University (ANU), Canberra, Australia.

2 Assistant Professor of Public Law at Shiraz University

10.22091/ijicl.2026.15439.1239

Abstract

This article examines the legal and strategic limits of preventive force within the framework of the jus ad bellum, using Israel’s policy toward Iran and the June 2025 Twelve-Days War as a contemporary case study. It argues that preventive military action directed at nuclear-threshold capability confronts structural constraints embedded in Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Drawing upon the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the study demonstrates that nuclear latency and prospective capability do not meet the gravity threshold required to constitute an “armed attack” capable of triggering the inherent right of self-defense.

At the same time, the article situates this legal analysis within a broader theoretical framework, engaging realism, rational choice theory, and constructivist insights. It shows how security dilemma dynamics, bounded rationality, and identity-based threat constructions may sustain coercive strategies even when they generate diminishing strategic returns and heightened escalation risks. The interaction between legal constraint and strategic miscalculation produces a condition of enduring legal fragility, in which coercion operates below the threshold of lawful force yet fails to secure durable deterrence. The limits of coercion, therefore, are both juridical and systemic, embedded in the Charter framework and reinforced by the structural dynamics of protracted rivalry.

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Iranian Journal of International and Comparative Law

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 04 May 2026

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